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TITLE VI- DEPOSITIONS
I. INTRODUCTION
Title VI1 expands Rule 15 of the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure 2 to permit the Government to depose its witnesses in
certain limited classes of cases. Previously only the defendant had
been accorded this right. 3 Upon the motion of either party at any
time after a criminal indictment or information has been filed, the
court may order that the testimony of the party's witnesses be
taken by deposition if "due to exceptional circumstances it is in
the interest of justice" that such testimony be taken and pre-
served. Such exceptional circumstances were intended by Con-
gress to include the existence of a substantial risk that the witness
will die, become seriously ill, be killed or injured, hide or leave the
jurisdiction, be kidnapped, bribed or improperly influenced. 4 A
motion by the Government must contain a certification by the
Attorney General or his designee that the proceeding for which
the deposition is taken is directed against a person believed to
have participated in an organized criminal activity. 5
The authorization for prosecution depositions marks a signifi-
cant change in federal criminal procedure. In 1946 the Advisory
Committee for the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure drafted a
similar proposal which was rejected by the Supreme Court. A
'Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, 18 U.S.C.A. § 3503 (Supp. 1971).
2 FED. R. CRIM. P. 15.
3 FED. R. CRIM. P. 15 states, in pertinent part:
If it appears that a prospective witness may be unable to attend or prevented
from attending a trial or hearing, that his testimony is material and that it is
necessary to take his dep6sition in order to prevent a failure of justice, the
court at any time after the filing of an indictment or information may upon
motion of a defendant and notice to the parties order that his testimony be
taken by deposition and that any designated books, papers, documents or
tangible objects, not privileged, be produced at the same time and place.
The district court decides as a matter of discretion when a deposition is necessary to
prevent a "failure of justice." See In re Russo, 19 F.R.D. 278 (E.D.N.Y. 1956), affd sub
nom. Russo v. United States 241 F.2d 285 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 816 (1957).
4S. REP. No. 91-617, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 151 (1969), (hereinafter cited as SENATE
REPORT). Any argument that this language is overbroad in that it fails to announce specific
criteria for the granting of such a motion does not appear to be well founded. Compare
FED. R. CRIM. P. 33, which allows the court to grant a new trial to defendants "if required
in the interest of justice." The Supreme Court has allowed district and appellate courts full
discretion in interpreting this provision, and has declined to review any of the cases
challenging such discretion. See cases compiled in FED. R. CRIM. P., 18 U.S.C.A Rule 33,
n.50 (1961).
5 18 U.S.C.A. § 3503(a)(Supp. 1971).
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member of the Advisory Committee later suggested that the
Coirt's action was perhaps taken out of "a feeling that the gov-
ernment could better afford to lose a few cases than make even a
gesture which might be interpreted as favoring a trial on a paper
record." 6 However, in committee hearings and deliberations on
the Organized Crime Control Act, Congress determined that the
Government must be allowed to exercise this authority in order to
secure a more satisfactory conviction rate of organized crime
operatives. Although police generally solve about fifty percent of
all homicide cases, the Senate Committee on the Judiciary pointed
out that only a "handful" of the average of twenty known Chicago
gangland killings per year for the past fifty years have been
solved, and concluded that "[t]his is an intolerable degree of
immunity from legal accountability." 7  Moreover, statistical
analysis by the FBI shows that members of organized crime have
obtained dismissals or acquittals of charges against them at a rate
more than twice that for ordinary offenders.8 This study also
indicated that 17.6 percent of these defendants had obtained ac-
quittals or dismissals of cases against them five or more times
each. 9 In accounting for this dismal record of convictions against
organized crime leaders, Congress found that the defendant's
"most effective weapon" in preventing a conviction is tampering
with evidence in the hands or mouths of witnesses. 10 Where a key
Government witness balks at the last minute, the prosecution may
be forced to dismiss the case, with the defendant possibly gaining
permanent immunity under the double jeopardy provision of the
fifth amendment."' Thus, the primary purpose of title VI, as
stated by the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, is to remove the
6 Hearings on S. 30 Before the Subcomm. on Crim. Laws and Procedure of the Senate
Comm. on the Judiciary, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 464 (1969), quoting Dession, The New
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure: 11, 56 YALE L.J. 197, 218 (1956).
7
SENATE REPORT 41.
8 Id. 42. Of course, one can argue that this result does not necessarily stem solely from
the difficulty of finding willing witnesses to testify against organized crime figures. It is
certainly arguable that some of the other reasons may include the ability of such defend-
ants to procure more competent counsel and the possibility that prosecutors may be more
willing to seek indictments against such figures on inadequately supported charges.
9 SENATE REPORT 42.
1Old. 60-61. This is probably the most effective weapon for any criminal defendant.
Congress found, however, that the ability to discourage Government witnesses from testi-
fying was particularly pronounced among organized crime figures because of the resources
and organization at their disposal. Among other difficulties noted in obtaining evidence
against such defendants were the general lack of incentive among members of the public to
report instances of organized criminal activity not directly affecting them, and the difficulty
of obtaining meaningful documentary evidence in such cases. Id. 44.
-1 See Downum v. United States, 372 U.S. 734 (1963), holding that where a jury was
sworn, impaneled, and then discharged on the Government's motion due to absence of a
prosecution witness over defendant's objection, the impaneling of a second jury two days
later-at which time the Government had procured its witness-constituted double jeop-
ardy.
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chief incentive to tamper with witnesses or their testimony, and to
prevent criminal prosecutions involving organized crime from
being thwarted through such means as murder, assault, in-
timidation or bribery of Government witnesses.
12
II. CONSTITUTIONAL CONSIDERATIONS
At the outset an argument can be raised that title VI may be
constitutionally infirm because of vagueness. The basis for the
argument is that nowhere in the Act are the terms "organized
crime" or "organized criminal activity" defined.13 Thus the deci-
sion whether a defendant may reasonably be suspected of having
engaged in an "organized criminal activity" will depend on the
district courts' interpretation of that term. The proscription
against vague and indefinite laws reflects a fear that without
adequate specificity defendants would not be sufficiently apprised
of wrongful acts, and the law would not be susceptible to in-
telligent interpretation by juries and courts.14 However, in title
VI, the term "organized criminal activity" is not made the basis
for imposition of a penalty.' 5 Moreover, the Supreme Court has
recognized the impracticability of drafting precise statutes touch-
ing all aspects of criminal laws, and has repeatedly upheld the
constitutionality of statutes couched in broad terms.'6
12 SENATE REPORT 60-61. in testimony given in support of title VI, New York County
District Attorney Frank Hogan cited the case of one Peter LaTempa who died from
poisoning while in jail in New York on January 12, 1945. LaTempa had been scheduled to
testify for the State at the murder trial of Vito Genovese and four co-defendants. At the
trial, held in 1946, the court directed acquittal for lack of evidence. Id. 62.
13 This intentional omission apparently stems from congressional unwillingness to have
effective enforcement of title VI hamstrung by a definition which may prove too restrictive
in practice. Senator McClellan, co-sponsor of the original bill, S. 30, 91 st Cong., I st Sess.
(1969), noted that "organized crime" is not a precise and operative legal concept calling it
"a functional concept like 'white-collar crime,' serving simply as a shorthand method of
referring to a large and varying group of criminal offenses committed in diverse circum-
stances." McClellan, The Organized Crime Control Act, 46 NOTRE DAME LAw. 55, 61
(1970).
14 See Baggett v. Bullitt, 377 U.S. 360 (1964).
15 A certification by the Attorney General that the defendant is one believed to have
participated in an organized criminal activity merely has the effect of permitting deposition
of selected prosecution witnesses. See text accompanying note 26 infra for a discussion of
constitutional standards governing the use of depositions at trial of any criminal defendant.
Since title VI conforms to these standards, it would be difficult for a defendant to claim
violation of due process rights on the ground that he was wrongfully certified as one
believed to have participated in an organized criminal activity.
16 See, e.g., Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91 (1945) (language of Criminal Code, 18
U.S.C. § 242 (1964), making it a crime for a person acting under color of law to subject
any inhabitants to the deprivation of "any rights, privileges, or immunities secured or
protected by the Constitution and laws of the United States," held sufficiently definite);
Jordan v. DeGeorge, 341 U.S. 223 (195 1) (phrase, "any crime involving moral turpitude"
as used in federal legislation respecting grounds for deportation of aliens held sufficiently
definite); Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942) (phrase, "any offensive,
derisive, or annoying word," used in criminal statute directed against utterance, held
sufficiently definite).
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Title VI, in allowing depositions of unavailable witnesses to be
used at trial, has been criticized on the ground that it violates the
defendant's sixth amendment right to confront witnesses against
him. 17 The Supreme Court has traditionally held, however, that
prior testimony of an unavailable witness is not a violation of the
confrontation clause. 18 In a recent interpretation of the con-
frontation clause, the Court indicated that the prosecution must
show only an unsuccessful "good faith effort" to locate its witness
to justify its claim that such witness is "unavailable." 19 Moreover,
in the recent decision of California v. Green,20 the Court allowed
the introduction of testimony taken at a preliminary hearing,
where full cross-examination had been allowed, to show in-
consistent statements made by the state's witness at the sub-
sequent trial. Although not necessary to its holding, the Court
discussed whether such testimony would have been con-
stitutionally admissible if the witness had not been present at the
trial. In concluding that it would, the Court felt it significant that
the testimony at the preliminary hearing had "been given under
circumstances closely approximating those that surround the typi-
cal trial." 21 Mr. Justice White, writing for the majority in this, 7- 1
decision, noted that such "circumstances" included the witness
being under oath, the proceedings being conducted before a judi-
cial tribunal equipped to provide a judicial record of the proceed-
ings, and the defendant being represented by counsel, with a full
opportunity for cross-examination. 22
Finally, in Dutton v. Evans23 the Court held that the admission
of the testimony of a prosecution witness in a murder trial as to a
statement made by the defendant's alleged accomplice while in
custody after the crime, did not violate defendant's right to con-
frontation. The accomplice did not appear at the trial. Although a
majority of the Court could not agree on an opinion, the Court's
17 See.Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965). Admission into evidence of a transcript of
testimony taken at a preliminary hearing at which accused lacked counsel, and therefore
was unable to cross-examine the witness, was a denial of his right to confrontation.
18
Id. at 407; Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237 (1895) (upheld use of recorded
testimony of two witnesses at first trial who had died prior to second trial).
'9 See Barber v. Page, 390 U.S. 719 (1968) (where state used transcript of a witness'
statement taken at a preliminary hearing as principal evidence against the accused, his
right of confrontation was violated where there was no showing that the state had made a
good faith effort to secure the presence of the witness, then in prison 225 miles away in
another state, at trial).
20399 U.S. 149 (1970).
2 1 Id. at 165.
221d. According to Mr. Justice Harlan, "[T]he Confrontation Clause of the Sixth
Amendment reaches no farther than to require the prosecution to produce any available
witness whose declarations it seeks to use in a criminal trial." Id. at 174 (concurring
opinion) (emphasis added).
2a400 U.S. 74 (1970).
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decision2 4 expressed the view that the defendant's right of con-
frontation was not violated under the circumstances of the case,
particularly since the accomplice's statement was not "crucial" or
"devastating" in view of the other evidence.2 5 Mr. Justice Harlan,
concurring in the result, expressed the view that the trial, con-
ducted in a Georgia court, should be governed by due process
standards of fairness under the fourteenth amendment and con-
cluded that these had been met.
26
When considered together, Green and Evans may be construed
as standing for the propositions that a defendant's rights under the
confrontation clause are not violated where (1) a deposition taken
under circumstances "closely approximating those that surround
the typical trial" 2 7 is used by the Government to impeach a
witness' prior testimony, or in the case of a witness who is
unavailable at trial; and (2) the admission of testimony concerning
statements made against the defendant by one not present at trial,
is determined to be not "crucial" or "devastating" in view of the
other evidence. Thus it appears that the requirements of the
confrontation *clause may be satisfied by standards far less rigor-
ous than an absolute right of the defendant to confront all prose-
cution witnesses at his trial. While a criminal defendant believed
to have participated in organized criminal activity may well object
to the deposition of prosecution witnesses prior to trial on the
ground that this would reveal his trial strategy, such objection
presents no constitutional bar to the proceedings. Moreover, this
objection should be somewhat muted when it is kept in mind that
the deposed witnesses will normally be crucial to the govern-
ment's case, and their depositions, usually taken well in advance
of trial, may result in a substantial revelation of the Government's
case against the defendant. Additionally, since title VI becomes
operative only after the filing of a criminal indictment or in-
formation,28 the only possible use for such depositions is in con-
nection with trial proceedings.
Against this backdrop of the Supreme Court's interpretation of
the confrontation clause, title VI appears to provide adequate
procedural safeguards to preserve defendants' sixth amendment
rights. First, as has been noted, the Government's motion for
deposition must contain the Attorney General's certification that
the defendant in the criminal action is a person believed to have
24The opinion was written by Justice Stewart, joined by Chief Justice Burger, and
Justices White and Blackmun.
25 400 U.S. at 87.
26400 U.S. at 93- 100.
27 399 U.S. 149, 165 (1970).
28 18 U.S.C.A. § 3503(a) (Supp. 1971).
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participated in an organized criminal activity.29 This provision
should act as a check against any tendency for the Government to
begin taking depositions routinely under the authority of title VI.
The moving party must then serve reasonable written notice of
the time and place of the taking of the deposition, along with the
identity of the deponent, to every other party. 30 All defendants
not in custody3 l have the right to attend the examination, and the
test for waiver of this right is intended to be the same as that for
waiver of presence of the defendant at trial.32 The court is ex-
pressly required to advise a defendant without counsel of his
rights, and to assign counsel to represent him unless the defendant
is able to retain counsel of his choice.33 Title VI seeks to further
guarantee the defendant's right to confrontation at the exam-
ination by requiring the Government to pay necessary travel and
subsistence expenses of the defendant and his attorney for attend-
ance in all cases where the deposition is taken on Government
initiative, or where the defendant appears unable to bear the
expense of taking a deposition.3 4 All depositions are to be taken
and filed in the manner prescribed for civil actions. 35 In addition,
it is expressly provided that no party defendant may be deposed
without his consent, and that the scope of examination and
cross-examination shall be the same as would be allowed in the
trial itself.3 6 Title VI further protects the defendant's due process
rights by requiring the Government to make available to the
defendant at the taking of the deposition any statement of the
29 See text accompanying note 5 supra. Although it is not clear what criteria the
Attorney General must meet in determining whether to make such a certification, it is
apparent that the courts must insure that a defendant's fifth amendment due process
rights-with their implicit core of fairness-are not abridged. It is possible that a lower
standard than "probable cause" will be allowed to justify such certification. But this
exercise of discretion must at least be governed by standards which are relevant to the
purpose of this provision. See Stack v. Boyle, 342 U.S. 1 (1951). Cf. Terry v. Ohio, 392
U.S. 1 (1968), where a police officer's "justifiable suspicion" that the defendant was
planning an armed robbery of a store warranted his stopping and searching the defendant
for concealed weapons.
30 18 U.S.C.A. § 3503(b) (Supp. 1971).
31 As to defendants in custody, the Act provides that "[t]he officer having custody of a
defendant shall be notified of the time and place set for the examination, and shall produce
him at the examination and keep him in the presence of the witness during the exam-
ination." 18 U.S.C.A. § 3503(b) (Supp. 1971).
32 SENATE REPORT 151. See in this regard Diaz v. United States, 223 U.S. 442 (1912),
where the voluntary absence of a defendant at a portion of the trial, coupled with his
express consent that it should proceed in the presence of his counsel, was held to
constitute waiver of his right of confrontation. For dicta equating voluntary absence with
waiver, see Parker v. United States, 184 F.2d 488, 489 (4th Cir. 1950); Kanner v. United
States, 34 F.2d 863 (7th Cir. 1929).
33 18 U.S.C.A. § 3503(c) (Supp. 1971).
34 Id.
3
5 See FED. R. Civ. P. 30, 31.
36 18 U.S.C.A. § 3503(d) (Supp. 1971).
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witness being deposed which is in the possession of the Govern-
ment and which it would be required to make available to the
defendant if the witness were testifying at trial.
3 7
The use at trial or any hearing of all or part of any depositions
taken in accordance with these provisions is limited to the cases
where it appears: that the witness is dead, that the witness is out
of the country (unless it appears that such absence was procured
by the party offering the deposition), that the witness is unable to
attend because of illness, that the witness refuses in the trial or
hearing to testify concerning the subject of the deposition offered,
or that the party offering the deposition has been unable to secure
the presence of the witness by subpoena.38 Further, consistent
with the Supreme Court's decision in California v. Green, a
deposition properly taken may be used by any party for the
purpose of contradicting or impeaching the testimony of the depo-
nent as a witness.3 9 Objections to receiving a deposition or part




Title VI represents a balanced, constitutionally sound attempt
by Congress to remedy effectively what it has found to be a
serious impediment to the administration of justice in criminal
proceedings brought against participants in organized criminal
activities; namely, the possibility that such persons might attempt
to subvert the legal process through such means as murder, as-
sault, intimidation, bribery and other unlawful acts directed
against prosecution witnesses. 41 Although the failure to anywhere
37 Id. § 3503(e). See FED. R. CRIM. P. 16. For purposes of a motion to produce
documentary evidence for inspection, it need only appear that the evidence is relevant,
competent and outside of any exclusionary rule; and it is not sufficient basis for denial of
such motion that the trial judge might have, in exercise of his discretion, excluded the
evidence without thereby committing reversible error, since the question on application for
order to produce is one of admissibility under the traditional canons of evidence. Gordon
v. United States, 344 U.S. 414, 420 (1953).
38 18 U.S.C.A. § 3503(0 (Supp. 1971).
3 9 Id.
40 18 U.S.C.A. § 3503(g) (Supp. 1971). See FED. R. Civ. P. 32. The overruling of such
an objection can be made the basis for a petition for immediate review by mandamus. In re
United States, 348 F.2d 624 (C.A. Puerto Rico 1965).
41 SENATE REPORT 60-61. Also in this regard, then-Senator Tydings, in testimony
before the Senate Subcommittee based in part on his experience as a U.S. Attorney in
Maryland, said:
Unimplicated witnesses have been, and are now, regularly bribed, threat-
ened, or murdered. Scores of cases have been lost because key witnesses
turned up in rivers in concrete boots. Victims have been crushed-James
Bond like-along with their automobiles by hydraulic machines in syndi-
cate-owned junkyards.
Hearings on S. 30 Before the Subcomm. on Crim. Laws and Procedure of the Senate
Comm. on the Judiciary, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 161 (1969).
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define the terms "organized crime" and "organized criminal activ-
ity" renders the scope of title VI more ambiguous than might be
desired, the Act nevertheless provides some guidance. The re-
strictions allowing depositions to be taken and used only when
"due to exceptional circumstances it is in the interest of jus-
tice," 42 and only under certain specified conditions should min-
imize the possibility of abuse of this authority by the Govern-
ment. Moreover, Congress has expressly admonished that depos-
itions are not to be taken routinely. 43
42 18 U.S.C.A. § 3503(a) (Supp. 1971).
43 H.R. REP. No. 91- 1549, 91st ConR., 2d Sess. 49 (1970).
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